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Presidential Attacks on the
Constitutionality of Federal




Can it be presumed, that Persons
sworn to execute the Laws, shall
openly counteract and violate them?'
I. INTRODUCTION
To what extent may the President, through the Department of
Justice, challenge the validity of federal statutes signed into law by the
President? This constitutional question, newly emergent, lies at the core of
several recent cases that deal with the congressional veto. The Supreme
Court has thus far avoided ruling on the merits of the veto.2 When the
Court does so, as likely it will fairly soon, the Justices will perforce have to
confront the question of the propriety of executive officers admitting the
unconstitutionality of the veto or directly challenging the veto power. The
Justices will also be confronted with the important, unresolved theoretical
question of what is "the United States" in separation of powers litigation.
Although the legislative veto has been extensively discussed, 3 no attention
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1. M. KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX 42 (1972). The statement originally appeared in the
Independent Reflector, a New York weekly newspaper, in 1753.
2. For example, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 n.176 (1976). expressly declined
to decide the constitutionality of the one-house veto. See also Clark v. Valco, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.),
affd men. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct.
Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009(1978); McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258(4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978) (avoiding review of legality of a legislativeveto provision based on a
decision that even if it was unconstitutional, it was not severable from the rest of the statute).
Other than Atkins, there is littlejudicial comment on the constitutionality of the legislative veto.
Justice White, for example, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 256-86,
was the only member of the Court to discuss the one-house veto provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act. Justice White felt that regulatory power generally "is not rendered constitutionally
infirm ... by a statutory provision subjecting agency regulations to disapproval by either House of
Congress." Id. at 284. See also Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 15 & n.17 (1941), in which the Court in
dictum spoke positively, at least in policy terms, about legislative review mechanisms, lumping one-
house veto together with simple layover measures.
3. See Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulations: A Study of
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1369 (1977); Cooper & Cooper, 7he Legislative V'eto and the
Constitution, 30 GeO. WASH. L. REV. 467 (1962); Ginnane, The C(ontrol of FederalAdministration by
Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953); Javits & Klein,
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has been accorded those two preliminary but critical questions which must
be answered before there can be a definitive resolution of the growing use
of the veto by Congress. This article outlines the issues associated with the
congressional veto and suggests needed statutory reforms.
Two cases are illustrative. In Clark v. Kimmitt,4 Ramsey Clark,
former Attorney General and candidate for Senator from New York, filed
suit in federal district court as a "voter" under the Federal Election
Campaign Act, for the sole purpose of testing the validity of the "one-
house" veto provision of that statute. The statute requires the Federal
Elections Commission (FEC) to submit proposed regulations to Congress,
which has thirty legislative days to consider them. A formal vote of
disapproval by either house is enough to kill the regulations, in whole or in
part. If Congress does nothing, the FEC regulations become effective.5
Judge Charles Richey certified the case to the court of appeals, which, after
an en banc hearing, dismissed the suit on procedural grounds. 6 When
Clark petitioned for certiorari, the Supreme Court requested the Solicitor
General to file a brief on behalf of "the United States." At both appellate
levels, the Department of Justice admitted or challenged the con-
stitutionality of the one-house veto; in so doing, it equated "the United
States" with the executive branch.
Similarly, when 140 federal judges sued in the Court of Claims for
increased salary, the Department conceded the unconstitutionality of a
legislative veto provision. That case, Atkins v. United States,7 presented
the novel situation in which plaintiff and defendant agreed on the merits of
the crucial statutory provision, yet the court forged ahead to rule on the
merits. To the disappointment of the judges, tile court upheld the
legislative veto by a bare majority. Atkins remains the only instance thus
far in which a court has definitively ruled on the legitimacy of the veto. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, after the Department of Justice
continued to attack a segment of the statute that it had argued was
otherwise valid. The Department again maintained that "the United
States" was synonymous with the executive branch.
Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y,U.L. REv. 455
(1977); McGowan, Congress, Courts, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLuM. L. Rav. 1119
(1977); Miller& Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 INn,
L.J. 367 (1977); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63
CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1975).
4. Clark v. Valco, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd sub nom. Clark v, Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950
(1977).
5. An analogous method is employed for the adoption of federal rules of civil procedure. See the
statement of Justices Black and Douglas dissenting to the Supreme Court order that amended certain
rules of civil procedure, published at 374 U.S. 865, 865-66 (1966). See also Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S.
1, 15 & n.17 (1941).
6. Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 647 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950
(1977).
7. 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (19711).
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These cases, and others of recent vintage,8 suggest several matters of
concern in separation of powers theory and doctrine. First, both cases
should have been styled President v. Congress, for that, in fact and in
effect, is what they were. Former President Ford, in signing the Federal
Election Campaign Act, said that the Attorney General would contest
what the President thought was an unconstitutional provision. 9 Second,
Congress cannot always rely on the Department of Justice in litigation.
Each house of Congress has had to hire special counsel so that the interests
of Congress could be represented. Last, the Department is not required to
notify Congress about its litigating posture. The consequence of this
omission is that some statutory provisions duly enacted by Congress and
signed into law by the President receive only ad hoe, even fortuitous
defenses when attacked by private litigants. For instance, in Atkins only
when the Court of Claims, sua sponte, wrote to the Vice President and the
Speaker was Congress officially notified; it then came in only as an amicus,
not as a primary party, for the judges had named the United States, not
Congress, as defendant. The Executive, in such instances, has acted
vicariously through private litigants.'0
Under the United States Code, conduct of litigation for the United
States is reserved to the Department of Justice: "Except as otherwise
authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United
States . . . is a party, or is interested, . . . is reserved to officers of the
Department of Justice, under the discretion of the Attorney General.""
Additionally, the intervention statute, 28 United States Code section
2403, provides: "In any action . . . to which the United States . . . is
not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting
public interest is drawn into question, the court . . . shall certify such
8. Eg., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
No. 77-1702 (9th Cir. appeal docketed July 18, 1977); Nixon v. Solomon, No. 77-1395 (D.C. Cir., filed
Aug. 10, 1977); McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011
(1978); and Staats v. Lynn, No. 75-055 (D.D.C., Nov. 26, 1975) (dismissed by stipulation).
9. Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Statement by the President on
Signing S. 3065 Into Law, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doec. 857,858 (May 11, 1976). President Carter
has taken the same position on the legislative veto as his predecessors. 7e Legislatiie feto-Message
From the President of the United States 124 CoNG. REc. H5879-80 (daily ed. June 21, 1978).
10. Individual members of Congress are making increasing use ofthe courts to test the validity' of
specific executive actions. See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S.907 (1978) (challenging President's use of treaty power to convey United States properties to
Panama); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Family Practice of Medicine Act held
to have become law despite President's refusal to sign).
The President has not attempted to obtain such a judicial test of a statute; it is thus uncertain
whether the Kennedy strategy could be employed by the executive branch, although it is hombook
administrative law that officers of the federal bureaucracy cannot challenge the constitutionality of a
statute addressing the powers ofgiven agencies. 3 K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAWTREATISE § 20.04, at
74 (1958). See also Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Board No. 11, Cheyenne, Wyoming, 393
U.S. 233,242 (1968); Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287,294 (7th Cir. 1976); Engineers Pub. Serv.Co.
v. SEC, 138 F.2d 936, 952 (D.C. Cir.), remanded per curiam with directions to dismiss as moot, 332
U.S. 788 (1947).
For a good but rather dated analysis of congressional attacks on executive power, see Note,
Congress Versus the Executive: The Role of the Courts, 11 HARv. J. LEGts. 352 (1974).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1976).
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fact to the Attorney General, and shall permit the United States to
intervene on the question of constitutionality."' 12 Again, the
Attorney General directs and controls the litigation.
Were two matters clear-the meaning of the term "the United
States" and that the Attorney General is indeed an officer independent of
the President and Congress-the problems to be discussed herein would
not arise. If they did arise, the problems could be quickly resolved by a
small change in the quoted code provisions. But these matters are distinctly
unclear. It is, for example, disingenuous to assert that the Attorney
General does not follow the wishes of the Chief Executive. Another
unanswered issue is the litigating responsibility of the Attorney General:
who, indeed, is his client when he represents the United States?
This article focuses on overt, albeit indirect, challenges by the
Department of Justice in interbranch governmental disputes. We do not
deal with other aspects of what in fact is a far larger problem. A
comprehensive analysis should include inquiry into at least the following
relevant issues: the nature and extent of prosecutorial discretion; failure of
the executive branch to enforce judicial decisions, which under the
principle enunciated in Cooper v. Aaron13 are "the law of the land";
refusals by the President to spend appropriated funds; 4 assertions by a
President during extraordinary emergencies that he can ignore statutes; 1$
neglect, by design or otherwise, to implement statutes; 6 and choices that
must at times be made between apparently inconsistent statutes. 17 Fuller
explication must await another time and another forum.
As is the norm in separation of powers, the delphic language of the
fundamental law provides merely a point of departure for analysis rather
than answers. There are, furthermore, no prescribed criteria of
judgment-for example, the intentions of the framers-by which solutions
can be obtained. When answers eventually come, they will incorporate a
combination of political theory and policy considerations. Only by an
intellectually indefensible fiction could answers be logical derivations from
the constitutional text. Existing doctrine will play no part, for there is
none. Little exists in the Constitution to provide more than a directional
signal for further analysis: the President is vested with "the executive
power,"'18 but that is undefined; he must "take care that the laws"'19 are
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1976) (emphasis supplied).
13. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
14. But see Staats v. Lynn, No. 75-055 (D.D.C,, Nov, 26, 1975) (dismissed by stipulation),
discussed at notes 120-23 and accompanying text infra.
15. See generally Becker, The Supreme Court's Recent "National Security Decisions, 40TENN.
L. REv. 1 (1972); Developments in the Law - The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties,
85 HARV. L. Rev. 1130 (1972).
16. E.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C, Cir, 1974).
17. See, e.g., Miller & Pierson, Observations on the Consistency of Federal Procurement
Policies With Other Governmental Policies, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 277 (1964).
18. U.S. CoNsT. art. 11, § 1, cl. 1.
19. Id. art. II, § 3.
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faithfully executed; and he swears an oath to uphold and defend the
Constitution. 20 As for Congress, it has all legislative power "herein
granted,' which includes a rarely litigated provision of potentially
immense significance-the second half of the "necessary and proper"
clause: "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof. ' 22 The self-asserted power of the Supreme
Court to be "infallible" because it is "final" 23 gives that tribunal, if it wishes
to take the case and not flee into the swamp of the political question
doctrine, an opportunity not only to settle the validity of the congressional
veto but also to resolve the two subsidiary issues discussed in this article.
II. SOME RELEVANT HISTORY
Those who drafted the Constitution did not, of course, contemplate a
legislative veto. If one were to follow an antiquarian conception of
constitutional adjudication, then such a veto would doubtless be invalid.
Despite contrary language from some commentators and judges, the
Supreme Court has never been bound by such filiopietistic notions. So,
too, with the power of the Executive to challenge the constitutionality of
statutes; it is evident from the sparse records of the convention that the
framers simply did not think of such a possibility. Thus the relevant history
associated with our two matters of concern, that is, the propriety of the
executive branch challenging the legislative veto and the identity of "the
United States," consists of a clutch of judicial decisions, not one of which
answers either of our questions, and the legislative history of the applicable
United States Code provisions.
From 1787 to 1974, the Department of Justice failed to defend the
constitutionality of a statute in only four instances: Myers v. United
States;24 United States v. Lovett; 25 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital;26 and Senate Select Committee v. Nixon.2 7 These decisions may
be summarily treated.
Myers dealt with the power of the President to discharge, contrary to
statute, a postmaster who had been confirmed by the Senate. The statute,
the Tenure of Office Act, called for Senate approval of such actions. The
approval requirement was declared unconstitutional in a long opinion by
Chief Justice Taft, who repudiated the position he had taken as professor
20. Id. art. I, § 1, cl. 8.
21. Id. art. I, §1.
22. Id. arL I, § 8, cl. 18.
23. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
24. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
25. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
26. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
27. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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and ex-President and upheld the Presidential prerogative. The postmaster
had instituted the action against "the United States," but the Department
of Justice argued the case on behalf of the postmaster. Congress was
represented by Senator George Wharton Pepper as amicus curiae. The
Solicitor General argued for the unconstitutionality of the statute.
28
Lovett, a better known case, concerned the constitutionality of a
statutory provision that denied Lovett and his colleagues their salaries.
The Department allied itself with Lovett and argued that when an
Act of Congress is patently unconstitutional, the Constitution must
predominate. 29 Lovett prevailed on the constitutional prohibition against
any bill of attainder or ex post facto law. Congress, after being notified by
the Attorney General that he could not in conscience argue for the validity
of the statute, employed private counsel. As in Myers, no one questioned
the propriety of the posture of the Attorney General."
Simkins came next, and differs in that it was a suit between two
private litigants.3" Plaintiffs challenged their exclusion from federally
funded hospitals constructed 'pursuant to the "separate but equal"
provision of the Hill-Burton Act.32 Defendants objected to an attempted
intervention by the United States through the Department of Justice,
claiming that there was no constitutional issue and that intervention was
improper when the United States sought to attack its own statute. These
objections brought into issue the meaning of section 2403 and the
legitimacy of the Department's action. The district .judge felt constrained
to read the intervention statute literally. Holding that the court lacked
discretion in allowing intervention, the judge said: "I suppose [the
Attorney General] can take any position he desires. ' " The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed and the Supreme Court denied
34certiorari. 3
28. 272 U.S. at 98.
29. 328 U.S. at 306.
30. Id.
31. Therefore 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1976), quoted at text accompanying note 12, came into play,
32. 323 F.2d at 961. The challenged provisions were a portion of the Hospital Survey and
Construction (Hill-Burton) Act of 1946, Pub. L. No.79-725,60 Stat. 1040,1043(1946), as atnenled, 42
U.S.C. § 291e(f) (1976). See also 42 C.F.R. § 53.112 (1977).
33. Transcript of Oral Argument at 84, Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., No. C-57-
G-62 (M.D.N.C. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1063), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964) reprinted
in Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings Before the Subconun,
on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess., 489 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Congress in Court].
But compare the Court's decision on intervention in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 36 F. Supp. 790,
792 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), aff'd, 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943):
In permitting this intervention, I am of the belief that the constitutionality of subdivision (b)
of § 16 has been "drawn in question." By this I do not mean to hold that from now on the
government has free rein in this litigation. The government itself recognizes the limited
purpose of its intervention when it concedes that it is only interested on the state of the
pleading in presenting evidence and arguments in support of the constitutionality of
subdivision (b).
34. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cerl. denied, 376
U.S. 938 (1964).
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Simkins is the one case that has to date squarely posed the meaning of
section 2403. It is here that the secti6n's legislative history becomes
relevant. During the formative years of the New Deal, 1934-1936, the
Supreme Court struck down thirteen acts of Congress: one-fourth of the
total number that it had previously invalidated. Most of the statutes were
anti-Depression measures. Particularly vexatious to the President and
Congress was that many of these decisions resulted from private suits in
which no one appeared on behalf of the government. 3 Public policy was
being made in those lawsuits, which at times concerned only trivial matters
for the litigants but had portentous consequences for the nation. An
example is the Gold Clause Cases36 in which national monetary policy
turned on whether a plaintiff was entitled to recover fifteen dollars and
sixty cents-a situation that bemused some Europeans, who could not
understand how such important policy matters could be left to settlement
by lawyer-judges in private litigation.37
Under pressure from the White House, Congress enacted H.R. 2260,
which ultimately became 28 United States Code section 2403, "to provide
for appearance on behalf of and appeal by the United States in certain
cases in which the constitutionality of acts of Congress is involved." 3' The
House Judiciary Committee report on the bill recognized the need for such
a statute: "In cases between private litigants in which the constitutionality
of an act of Congress is attacked by one of the parties, no representative of
the Government may now appear as a matter of right to defend the
statute,"39 Can there be any doubt that Congress, by enacting H.R. 2260,
intended to provide a means whereby the public's (the government's)
interest could be defended in private litigation? The answer is clear beyond
peradventure; as President Roosevelt commented, the statute "accords the
Government the right to defend the constitutionality of the law of the land.
No longer must the Government stand idly by, a helpless spectator, while
the Acts of Congress are stricken down by the Courts."40 The court was
obviously on shaky ground when intervention was granted in Simkins to
permit the Department of Justice to attack the "separate but equal"
35. The analogy today is that no one appears on behalf of Congress, save when Congress itself is
the defendant.
36. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935);
Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240(1935); United Statesv. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S.240
(1935).
37. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 103-04 (1941).
38. Conference Report on H.R. 2260 (August 10, 1937) reprinted in Hearings on Congress in
Court, supra note 33, at 485.
39. H.R. REP. No. 212, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937). Atkins v. United States illustrates this
concern: Congress was before the court only as amicus and then only by the court's unilateral
invitation. 556 F.2d 1028, 1034 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
40. White House Press Release, August 25, 1937, at 2, reprinted in 122 CoNG. REC. S 17,084
(daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976). A further indication of the intent of Congress is that § 2 ofH.R. 2260, which
became 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976), and which provided interalia that if the United States intervenesand
the court decision declares the Act of Congress unconstitutional, then an appeal could be taken direetly
to the Supreme Court.
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provision of the statute. Because of intervening lawmaking, that provision
has become clearly invalid. There was no real need for the Department to
defend the statute.
Bailey v. Patterson41 had held that racial segregation under official
auspices was no longer "a litigable issue." Thus, in Bailey, the district court
had merely to take judicial notice of previous Supreme Court decisions
which held that no state may require racial segregation of transportation
facilities.42 Then in Simkins the Department explained to the district court
that "it is indisputable that today Congress would not include a 'separate
but equal' provision in a statute"; and "the United States" position in this
case is not "calculated to disappoint Congressional expectation. 4  In
other words, Congress had no defense to the constitutional challenge and
would not expect the Department to defend such a statute. Simkins is thus
a case in which the Executive attacked the constitutionality of a statute,
but which provides little basis for similar present-day actions. It is one
thing for the Department of Justice to attack a statute when all, including
Congress, can see that the statute is invalid; and quite another to do so
when the essence of the dispute lies between President and Congress. Judge
Richey recognized that distinction, at least inferentially, when he denied
the Department intervention of right in the Clark case and granted only
permissive intervention.
Finally, in Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, the Solicitor General
filed an amicus brief on behalf of the United States, asserting "that the
United States has an overriding interest in the doctrine of executive
privilege." 4 Such a statement meant that the Department equated "the
United States" with the executive branch, an understandable posture for
lawyers caught up in zealous pursuit of their client's interests; it also meant
that the Department considered the President to be its client. One can
readily understand the Executive taking such a position; what is beyond
comprehension is for the Supreme Court to invite, as it did in Clark, a brief
from the Department on behalf of "the United States." Since, as we have
said, the case should have been styled President v. Congress, one can only
conclude that the Justices were not thinking when they issued the request
to the Department. The only alternative conclusion is that the Court has
already prejudged the question of who is "the United States," and has
decided in favor of the Chief Executive. If so, that would indeed be a
parlous situation.
One additional historical item is relevant. In 1937, Attorney General
41. 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962).
42. E.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per
curiam); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
43. Unreported memorandum of United States in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.,
323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), reprinted in Hearings on Congress in
Court, supra note 33, at 484.
44. 498 F.2d at 726.
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Homer Cummings refused a request from the President to render an
opinion on the constitutionality of the Federal Home Loan Banks.45 The
Attorney General stated that only the President would have the proper
interest in questioning the validity of a measure passed by Congress, and
even that interest ceases ten days after the bill is presented to him. If it were
otherwise, Cummings continued, the Attorney General would be setting
himself up as "judge of the Acts of the Congress and of the President."4 6
Forty years later, the Attorney General is doing precisely what Cummings
said should not be done, by asserting the prerogative to attack a statute in
two situations: (1) when "upholding the statute would have the effect of
limiting the President's constitutional powers or prerogatives"; 47 and (2)
when "the Attorney General believes, not only as a matter of personal
conscience, but also as the chief legal officer of the United States, that a law
is so patently unconstitutional that it cannot be defendbd. '45
Clark and Atkins, McCorkle v. United States49 and Chadha v.
Immigration and Natuialization Service,50 and other cases exemplify the
current situation concerning the congressional veto. Some of these cases
are brought against Congress and the Department must intervene; some
are against the United States and the Department is a party as a matter of
right;, and some are against a specific agency and the Department acts as
the lawyer for that agency.
It might be thought that in Chadha and similar cases there is no true
case or controversy since the advocates are wholly in agreement on the
crucial issue, the validity of the congressional veto. Under normal
circumstances, the suit would be dismissed on prdcedural grounds, there
being no controversy to satisfy the requirement of article III of the
Constitution. Atkins could have been decided that way, but was not.
Speaking generally, other courts have sidestepped the case or controversy
problem and gone on to the merits, as in Atkins, or become entangled with
other procedural issues, as in Clark. How judges can find a true adversary
proceeding when plaintiff and defendant agree on the crucial issue is
completely mysterious.5'
45. 39 Op. Arr'y GEN. 11 (1937).
46. Id. at 15. For the proposition that the executive branch should defer to the courts on
constitutional questions, see 40 Op. Anrr'y GEN. 158 (1942); 36 Op. ATTY GEN. 21 (1935); 31 Op.
A'TfY GEN. 475 (1919).
47. Hearings on Congress in Court, supra note 33, at 5. Under those circumstances, asserts th
Department, the President is "entitled to a defense of his perceived rights." Id.
48. Id. at 6.
49. 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
50. No. 77-1702 (9th Cir. appeal docketed July 18, 1977). See notes 125-31 and accompanying
text infra.
51. The question of the standing of the Attorney General to challenge the constitutionality of
statutes is not given full-dress treatment here. Only if the courts perceive that the question in the cases
being discussed is really President v. Congress, rather than a private litigant against a government
department, can it be said that rights are indeed in conflict, and then only if the President has a"right"
in fact. It is our position in the present paper that the President does not have ajusticiable article Ill
right. He piggybacks on private litigants, such as Mr. Chadha, and goes into court-as in the Clark
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III. WHAT IS "THE UNITED STATES"?
We come, then, to our first question: what, in constitutional theory, is
"the United States"? In most cases in which the Department of Justice
participates, whether civil or criminal, the answer is obvious. It is a
question that cannot be burked, however, when, as is increasingly the
vogue, separation of powers issues are before federal courts. Neither court
nor commentator has supplied an answer to the question. This section
outlines a possible approach to an answer.
The United States of America originated as a legislative body in
October 1774, when the First Continental Congress produced the
"Declarations and Resolves of the First Continental Congress."
52
Proclaiming for their respective Assemblies the right to legislate for the
colonies, "the good people of the several Colonies" devised the Con-
tinental Association-a merchants' agreement to cut off trade with
England. 53 According to one commentator, "the signature of the Asso-
ciation by members of Congress may be considered as the commencement
of the American Union. 54 Before the 1787 Constitution was adopted, all
acts of the United States of America were executed in the person of the
Congress. The Congress was the manifestation of the United States in
all its capacities, so that what was not performed by the Congress was
not performed by the United States. 55 Even so, one might still conclude
that under the Articles of Confederation the United States was some-
thing more than just the Congress. The central government, consisting
solely of a unicameral legislature, had actual powers that were of mar-
ginal utility. Even though the Articles defined the United States as a
"congress assembled, 56 the individual states were able to retain their
"sovereignty, freedom and independence" 57 by cloaking the Congress with
a very limited subject matter jurisdiction, and by denying Congress the
power to enforce its own legislation, particularly in the area of requisitions.
Congress would call for money, but had to await the voluntary compliance
of the States. 58
As Madison had observed, congressional inability to enforce its
objectives was responsible for the impotency of the Congress, in particular,
case-without any real disagreement between plaintiff and the Justice Department on the mcrits, See
also Comment, An Attorney General's Standing Before the Supreme Court to Attack the
Constitutionality of Legislation, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 624 (1959) (dealing mainly with state, not federal,
cases).
52. H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 82 (5th ed. 1949).
53. Id. at 83. This clause is embodied within the fifth paragraph of the Declaration.
54. R. HILDRETH, 3 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 46 (1882).
55. See H. HOCKETT, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES 246 (1933).
56. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 2.
57. Id.
58. See J. MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1737, at 5 (G. Hunt & J. Scott eds,
1920); THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 157 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961),
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and the United States as a whole: "[T]he states relieved from the pressure
of foreign danger, and flushed with the enjoyment of independent and
sovereign power; instead of a diminished disposition to part with it,
persevered in omissions and in measures incompatible with their relations
to the federal government." 59 Hamilton agreed: having "total want of
SANCTION to its laws,"60 Congress passed resolutions which became
"mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at their
option. 61
It is not surprising that many delegates to the Constitutional
Convention conceived of the national Executive as an extension of the
Congress. Quite a few delegates had originally thought it the goal of the
Convention merely to amend the existing Articles to provide the
Congress-in other words, "the United States"-with the powers that it
had been lacking. Once there was a consensus that a new constitution
would be devised, many delegates nevertheless believed that the basic re-
form would provide Congress with the means for enforcing its acts. For
example, Sherman thought that the purpose of the Executive would be to
carry the will of the Legislature into effect, and that the Executive should
thus be accountable to the Legislature.62 Sherman's view of the Executive,
as being logically and functionally subordinate to the Legislature, was not
unique. The original "Randolph plan" even contemplated election of the
Executive by the Legislature. Although this method of executive selection
was eventually rejected, it received majority approval throughout the
Convention. 63 The final plan, of course, attempted to achieve a balance
between efficiency and tyranny.64
Thus, in attempting to define "the United States," one must look not
only at the particular branches into which the government had been
divided, but also at the reasons for having so divided it. To the extent that
the creation of quasi-independent branches of government may be a means
to impede the wheels of government and thus prevent the tyranny that
would otherwise result from the concentration of powers in one hand, it is
appropriate to apply a functional analysis to the scope of executive
powers. An unchecked power to pick and choose those laws that are
worthy of enforcement, 6' a power currently asserted by the executive
branch, is as fatal to effective government as it was when the states existed
59. J. MADISON, supra note 58, at 5.
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 186 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (emphasis added).
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 158 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
62. J. MADISON, supra note 58, at 5.
63. See generaly E. DUMBAULD, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 255-63 (1964).
64. Modern scholarship is beginning to refute the conventional wisdom that considers separated
powers solely as a bulwark against tyranny. See, e.g., L. FIsnER, PRIDESIT AND CONoRsS 1-27 (1972);
W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1965).
65. See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838).
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under the Confederation. At its logical extreme, such power could mean an
item veto of existing law.
The measure of a government's power can be related to the nature and
extent of its sovereignty. Insofar as all power within the federal govern-
ment theoretically must find its source within the Constitution, the
United States, as a sovereignty, can be defined by the powers granted to it
from the people through the Constitution.66 One can readily see the basic
disparities between the English and American systems of government:
unlike the English model, in which all sovereign power is thought to
emanate from the Crown,67 the American system presupposes a popular
sovereignty. Thus, English history represents a series of restrictions upon
powers that had already been in existence; a series of increased limitations
that the people managed to place upon the otherwise presumptively
sovereign power of the Crown. Our Constitution, on the other hand, as
well as the United States, a fortiori, represents successive grants of powers
of sovereignty that were not otherwise promised. American sovereignty
rests within the people who have merely expressed their will in the form of
constitutional grants.68
The Crown thus acts in its legislative capacity, subject to the limi-
tation that it does so within the confines of ministerial responsibility, In
contrast, "the United States" exercises power not from the vantage point
of having had preexisting powers that have been subsequently restricted,
but rather from the position that it had no previous powers except those
that were specifically granted. Thus, in its legislative capacity, "the United
States" possesses the affirmative powers granted to the Congress, as well as
the negative power of the President to veto legislation: "The primary in-
ducement to conferring the power in question upon the Executive is, to
enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances
in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws. 69
It appears to be historically correct to define "the United States" by
th, powers conferred by the Constitution and to find any particular
department of the government acting within its sovereign capacity when it
acts within the scope of constitutionally delineated powers. Should one
necessarily conclude that the President's sole power to disapprove
legislation lies in the veto, and that the Justice Department, therefore, acts
improperly when it attacks a law as unconstitutionally infringing upon the
powers of the President? On the contrary, in Myers v. United States,70 the
66. Eg., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330,353 (1935); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,370
(1885).
67. "The law," said Sir William Blackstone, "ascribes to the King the attribute of sovereignty: he
is forever sovereign and independent within his own dominion." W. BLACKSTONE, COMmIENTARIES
*241-42, cited in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 458 (1793).
68. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793).
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 469 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
70. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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Court held that executive acquiescence to a congressional act that
infringed upon the President's appointment powers could not be
demonstrated by the President signing the bill into law, particularly when
the repugnant provisions of the Act were attached to an urgently needed
appropriations bill. At the urging of the Department of Justice, the Court
in Buckley v. Valeo7' also held that a particular statute infringed upon
executive power and therefore was unconstitutional, notwithstanding that
it had been duly enacted and signed into law by the President. 2 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority in National League of Cities v. Usery,73
noted that Myers and Buckley seemingly reject the argument that the veto
would be the President's sole weapon to protect his own interests.74
Within the above framework, the identity of "the United States"
remains unclear. The assumption underlying separation of powers theory
and the intervention statute, 28 United States Code section 2403, is that the
President and Congress will cooperate rather than fight. Indeed, as long
ago as 1908, Woodrow Wilson stated that "warfare" between Congress
and the Executive would be "fatal."' If separation of powers theory means
anything, it means that powers are shared, not separated. 76 As Justice
Story put it, the framers accepted a tripartite division of government but
"endeavored to prove that a rigid adherence to it in all cases would be
subversive of the efficiency of the government, and result in the destruction
of public liberties. 77
"The United States," then, is a construct; it is a metaphysical entity. In
constitutional theory, it exists even though it cannot be seen or touched.
No one has yet spelled out what "the United States" means, save in specific
instances, such as first amendment cases, in which the interests of an
individual are balanced against those of "society." Under the present
statute,78 the identity of "the United States" remains unclear. It is clear,
however, that "the United States" should not-indeed, cannot-be
equated with the executive branch. That conclusion is buttressed by an
examination of the interests of "the United States."
The recent case of United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co.7 9 (AT&T) is relevant. In AT&T the Justice Department sought to
71. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
72. Id. See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841-42 n.12 (1976).
73. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
74. Id. at 841-42 n.12.
75. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 51-52 (7th ed. 1927).
76. "[W]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 334 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
77. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNitD STATES § 533, at 396(5th
ed. 1891).
78. 28 U.S.C. §§ 516-519 (1976).
79. 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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enjoin the defendant from complying with a subpoena issued by a House
Subcommittee. Asserting that it was representing the United States, the
Department brought the suit to protect the "public interest." The court of
appeals recognized that although outwardly the case was between the
government and a private corporation, it actually was between the
President and the House of Representatives. The President did not want to
produce taped telephone calls because of an alleged interest in national
security; the House, on the other hand, had an interest in obtaining
compliance with the subpoena power that it had invoked to obtain records
of certain telephone calls. The only interest of AT&T was in obtaining ajudicial declaration of its legal obligation. Although finding jurisdiction
elsewhere, the court questioned the propriety of the Department's desire to
secure jurisdiction under 28 United States Code section 1345, the grant of
jurisdiction over suits brought by the United States. The difficulty, said the
court, was "whether a suit is brought 'by the United States' within § 1345
when the executive branch is seeking to enjoin the legislative branch."80
Of course there is a "difficulty"; no one branch of government can
be said to be "the United States." The United States may be hydra-headed,
but it is a single entity. Before demonstrating this, however, we will
briefly mention several inter- and intrabranch cases that have posed prob-
lems about the nature of that entity.
In United States v. Nixon,"' the President argued that the court lacked
jurisdiction because the controversy concerned an "in-house" dispute
raging within the executive branch. That view was rejected and the
Supreme Court proceeded to rule on the merits, allowing an employee of
the executive branch-the Special Prosecutor--to sue his putative
superior, the President. At least inferentially the court's decision means
that "the United States" is not to be equated with "the President." The
next conclusion is more difficult, but nonetheless clear: despite the Nixon
decision, "the executive branch" is not "the United States."
One way to answer the question, what is "the United States," is to ask
another question: what is an interest of "the United States"? A brief
discussion of this additional question is relevant at this time, in the context
of some judicial decisions.
The problem of identifying an interest of the United States in in-house
disputes was first considered by the Supreme Court in United States v.
ICC.82 The government, through the Department of Justice, sought to
have set aside an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) order that
denied the government restitution for allegedly unlawful rates charged by
the railroads. Since all suits seeking review of ICC orders were required by
80. Id. at 389. For a discussion of the AT&T case, see Comment, United States v. A T& T.
Judicially Supervised Negotiations and Political Questions, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 466 (1977).
81. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
82. 337 U.S. 426 (1948).
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statute to join the United States as a party defendant, the Commission
sought dismissal on the ground that the United States was suing itself. The
Court refused to be straitjacketed into such black-letter pronouncements,
holding that while the case might technically be United States v. United
States, it presented conflicts that were of a traditionally justiciable type.
The government, therefore, had the right to redress its injuries as a shipper.
The situations presented in AT&T and Clark are radically different
from that presented in ICC. In ICC, plaintiff United States did not appear
in a governmental capacity, but rather as an ordinary commercial user of
the railroads. The government's interest was pecuniary and thus more
easily identifiable. On the other hand, AT&T concerned the political
controversy of the proper allocation of power within the government. In
such interbranch disputes the interest of "the United States" is more
difficult to identify, although not entirely impossible. There is, however, a
threshold problem: to identify who will determine that interest. As the
Department of Justice argues, the United States has an interest in the
proper application of the Constitution. It merely avoids the issue,
however, to maintain that since the Attorney General is authorized by
statute to represent the interests of the United States, then the Attorney
General, and a fortiori, the President, has the authority to determine those
interests when the office of the President has a self-serving interest to
protect vis-a-vis the Congress.
As an officer within the executive branch, the Attorney General often
blurs the distinction between the broader interests of the government and
the narrower ones of the President. For example, when the one-house veto
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act were under con-
stitutional attack in Clark, the Department of Justice sought intervention
as plaintiff. Defendant Valeo challenged the propriety of this appearance
by "the United States" to attack the constitutionality of its own statute,
particularly when the Federal Elections Commission was defending the
statute. Although the district court allowed the government to intervene
"on behalf of the entities represented by the United States, namely, the
President of the United States, and the Executive Branch of the federal
government," 83 its decision was obviously based upon incongruously
identifying the United States with its agent, the Executive. In effect, the
cart was put before the horse. Although the President undoubtedly
represents the United States in certain constitutionally delineated areas,
this does not establish that the interests of the two entities are
interchangeable. The basic difficulty with the Department's position is
that it fails to adopt a position in litigation on behalf of "the United States"
that does not involve the intermediary step of identifying the United States
exclusively with the executive branch.
83. Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 647 n.4 (D.C. Cir.), aff'dsub nora. Clarkv. Kimmitt,431 U.S.
950 (1977).
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The court of appeals dismissed Clark for lack of ripeness, thus finding
it unnecessary to address the propriety of the appearance by the United
States "to argue for a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality of an act
of Congress in the interest of the President and Executive Branch alone."84
Judge Tamm, however, squarely addressed the issue in his concurring
opinion:
Nothing in our decision today should be taken as an approval of the sweeping
claim of the United States that in the absence of both a statutory
authorization to sue and an articulated injury to an interest of the federal
government as a whole, it nonetheless can come into court and challenge the
actions of one branch of the federal government as an unconstitutional
invasion of the powers of another branch.S
The "articulated injury to the whole" test proposed by Judge Tamm would
be consistent with the cases concerning pecuniary interests, such as ICC, as
well as with our view that "the United States" encompasses more than any
of its particular departments.
Cases affirming the broad discretionary power of the Attorney
General to undertake litigation on behalf of the government have typically
presented an articulated injury to the government as a whole. The
discretionary power is the Department's control over whether suit should
be brought. Thus, scandalous decisions not to prosecute generally have
been left to the realm of politics and newspaper headlines.8 6
When the Attorney General's power has been judicially expanded,
interbranch disputes have not been at issue. The benefits of the expanded
power did not inure to the political advantage of one branch over another
branch. In the leading case of United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co.,87 the
government brought suit to set aside a land patent that allegedly was
fraudulently issued. The Court rejected defendant's challenge to the
authority of the Attorney General to bring suit, ruling that when the
United States has a just cause requiring judicial relief, the Attorney
General has the authority to institute the suit on behalf of the government.
Crucial to the Court's position was the government's pecuniary interest in
its valuable mineral ores. San Jacinto consequently has no bearing on the
proper role of the Department of Justice in cases concerning the proper
allocation of power within the government. In re Debs" expanded the
Attorney General's authority to sue on behalf of "the United States" even
though there was no pecuniary interest at stake. Nevertheless, the
government's interest in unobstructed mail service is properly dis-
84. Id.
85. Id. at 654 (Tamm, J., concurring).
86. Political interference in the administration ofjustice is a related problem that is beyond the
scope of this article. At least one court, however, has held that plea bargaining results arc subject to
judicial approval. Eg., United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1977).
87. 125 U.S. 273 (1888).
88. 158 U.S. 564 (1894).
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tinguishable from the type of interest alleged in politically oriented
interbranch disputes.
A more difficult case is Booth v. Fletcher,8 ' in which the Attorney
Generars power to defend federal judges was upheld upon the theory that
the government has an interest in the proper performance of its officers'
duties, free from retaliatory actions. Judge Tamm, in Clark, describes such
an interest as one "shared by the United States as a whole and distinct from
an interest in defending the theory of one particular branch of the
government as to its constitutional prerogatives.' 9 While such an interest
lacks the certainty otherwise available when defining a pecuniary interest,
Booth, unlike A T&Tand Clark, did not bear upon constitutional issues or
concern an interbranch dispute. Nor was the Department of Justice
seeking to defend the powers of the President against alleged legislative
intrusion.
The proper advocacy role of the Attorney General involves legal
ethics.91 Attorneys act to further the best interests of their clients to the
extent the law permits. The Attorney General's client, by statute, is "the
United States." Given the excessive tendency to confuse the narrow
interests of the executive office with tHe broad interests of the nation, it is
difficult to maintain that the President, as chief executive, determines the
best interests of the nation in interbranch litigation. The United States has
an indisputable interest in the enforcement of presumptively valid
legislation, an interest that at least equals the President's interest in, for
example, executive privilege. This was verified by the experience under the
Articles of Confederation. At least in interbranch disputes, "the United
States" has no role to play. While "the United States" may have an interest
in the correct application of the Constitution, the conflicting interests of
segments of the United States Government cancel each other out; ajudicial
determination of rights should be reached without the Justice Department
pursuing the President's own interest in the manner of Presidential special
counsel.
Thus, we suggest that in interbranch litigation there is no such thing as
"the United States." There is the interest of the President, as in executive
89. 101 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
90. Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642,656 (D.C. Cir.), aff dsub non. Clarkv. Kimmitt,431 U.S.950
(1977) (Tamm, J., concurring).
91. The Department of Justice disagrees, concluding that
[t]he issue is not so much one of ethics in [the context of Buckley v. Valco] as comity. Wherea
legislative codefendant has been made aware of a contrary Department of Justice -iew,
retains its own counsel on that issue, and requests the Department to continue representation
on issues where there is no difference of opinion, the precise manner of submitting the
Attorney Generars views becomes one of accommodation and not ethics.
Hearings on Congress in Court, supra note 33, at 138.
In Buckley, the Department of Justice's so-called amicus brief on behalf of the Federal Election
Commission had five sections to it, and the first four did in fact contain an amicus brief. At the start of
the fifth section, however, the Department assumed the role of an advocate and argued that the statute
should be declared unconstitutional in certain respects. Therefore, in the fifth section. which was
physically part of the amicus brief, the Department of Justice was actually attacking the statute.
1979]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
privilege, and the interest of the Congress in the enforcement of its laws.
The interest of "the United States," if anything, is the interest of the people
of the United States in the fulfillment of constitutional provisions and in
adequate, responsive government.
Because an interest of "the United States" should be an interest of the
entire government, we can proceed to state affirmatively the meaning of the
term. It is to be equated with another ambiguous term, "the State."9' What,
then, is the State? The term is not easily defined.
Consider a recent assertion of Judge Roger Robb in Halkin v.
Helms.93 In denying relief to Americans who had been spied upon by the
National Security Agency, Robb called the "state secrets privilege"
absolute, adding that "a ranking of the various privileges recognized in our
courts would be a delicate undertaking at best, but it is quite clear that the
privilege to protect state secrets must head the list.' '94 The meaning of
Robb's statement is subtle, yet important: Judge Robb was articulating a
theory of the State that could be called organismic. The State has interests
that transcend those of the individuals in society, either singly or in groups.
This organismic conception of the State has a long intellectual
history, although no judge has ever spelled it out in detail. One example is
Justice Holmes' famous statement in Missouri v. Holland:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that are also a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into
life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to
realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century
and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they also
created a nation.95
Judge Learned Hand also maintained thatjudges "called upon to pass on a
question of constitutional law . . . must be aware of the changing social
tensions in every society which make it an organism. 96 Finally, Woodrow
Wilson commented that
government is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory
of the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to
Darwin, not to Newton. It is modified by its environment, necessitated by its
tasks, shaped to its functions by the sheer pressure of life.97
Hand, to be sure, spoke of society being "an organism," and Wilson of
government being "organic"; Holmes came closest to our notion of the
92. For analysis, see E. CASSIRER, THE MYTHI OF THE STATE (1946); A. D'ENTREVEs, TiE MODERN
NOTION OF THE STATE (1946); G. POGGI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE: A SocIOLooCAL
INTRODUCTION (1978).
93. No. 77-1922 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1978).
94. Id. slip opinion at 11.
95. 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
96. Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1930).
97. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1908).
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State. The three terms-society, government, State- are here employed
synonymously. Expressed another way, the State- and thus "the United
States"-is an anthropomorphic "group-person 98 with interests that
transcend the arithmetical sum of the interests of the individuals within the
body politic.
That theme, we suggest, runs through much of American con-
stitutional law. It is to be seen particularly in the law stated by federal
judges when they assert that they are "balancing interests" in civil rights
cases between those of the individual and those of a never-defined entity
called "society." 99 It would seem that the Supreme Court also analogizes
the group "the United States" to a biological being. The nation-state thus is
considered by the Court and political figures, such as the President, to be a
real person; the State is considered to have an existence separate and apart
from the individuals who live within its geographical boundaries.
President John F. Kennedy gave expression to this idea of a transcendent
"public interest" in 1962, when he answered a reporter's question
concerning collective bargaining agreements:
These companies are free and the unions are free. All we [the Executive] can
try to do is indicate to them the public interest which is there. After all, the
public interest is the sum of the private interests, or perhaps it's even some
times a little more. In fact, it is a little more.1°°
In other words, the nation takes on a life of its own, separate from and
greater than any of its constituent parts or, of greater significance, the
arithmetical sum of the private interests of the entity called "the United
States." Under this conception, "the United States" is greater than the sum
of the people of the nation-not the government and surely not one
branch. ,0
This metaphysical conception of the State will not be pursued further.
Our point is that when one speaks of "the United States," one evokes an
entity that encompasses society and government in a single artificial
being. The Constitution "in operation," as well as the Constitution "of the
books,' ' 02 recognizes the State as the overarching social reality. The State
98. 0. GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY: 1500 To 1800 (E. Barker trans.
1934), discussed in A. MILLER, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 157 (1977).
99. Sometimesjudges use"government" rather than"society," but whatever the word employed,
no one takes the trouble to define what is meant. Often, of course, the meaning of "government7 is
obvious. To equate society with government, however, is a particularly faulty type of thinking and
writing. Government is the apparatus of the State; society is that which is governed, an association of
discrete individuals who often associate in groups. As a general rule, the three terms-government,
State, and society-should be carefully distinguished and not used as synonyms. See, e.g., E. CAssuR,
supra note 92; A. D'ENTREVES, supra note 92; H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (A.
Wedberg trans. 1945); G. POGGI, supra note 92.
100. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1962, at 1, col. 4 (emphasis added).
101. On the dangers of such a conception, see, e.g., A. MILLERTnE MODERN CORPORATE STATE:
PRIvATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 154-61 (1976); A. DE RIENcouRT, TIlE
COMING CAESARS 9-10 (1964) (originally published in 1957); Barker, Introduction to 0. GIERKE
NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY, 1500 to 1800, at xxxiv (1957) (Gierke's work was origi-
nally published in 1913; Barker's translation was made in 1933).
102. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885).
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exists much like the business corporation-an artificial construct that is
more a method than a thing; and it exists in constitutional theory, even
though it has "no anatomical parts to be kicked or consigned to the
calaboose; no soul for whose salvation the parson may struggle; no body to
be roasted in hell or purged for celestial enjoyment."10 3 As a legal fiction,
the State--"the United States"-itself does no act, speaks no word, and
thinks no thoughts, but in its name those in government speak and for its
benefit men may die and property may be seized.
Surely that is what Judge Tamm contemplated when he spoke of an
"articulated injury to an interest of the federal government as a whole."
Surely, too, this construct makes it clear that no single branch can speak
for "the United States" when it conflicts with spokesmen for other
branches. And surely the Department of Justice is wrong in equating the
executive branch with the United States.
IV. THE PROPRIETY OF EXECUTIVE ATTACKS
ON STATUTES
Once it is perceived that "the United States" is a single entity with
multiple heads, then the question who should decide interbranch disputes
becomes important. United States v. Nixon10 4 established that the writ of
the Supreme Court can run against the President. Mr. Nixon capitulated,
after some hints from counsel that he might not, as did President Truman
following the decision in the Steel Seizure Case.t05 Nevertheless,
Presidential acquiescence in judicial pronouncements is by no means
certain. One need not cite President Jackson's perhaps apocryphal sneer
"John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it," to realize
that Chief Executives have been known to ignore a judicial decision. Ex
parte Merryman10 6 is perhaps the leading example. Ex parte Quirin10 7
could have been another but was not, principally because the Supreme
Court reacted supinely to executive demand. 08 Presidents, moreover, do
not have to overtly defy ajudicial decree; when their own powers are not at
103. W. HAMILTON, ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE CORPORATE VEIL 4 (1946), quoted in R. EELLS
& C. WALTON, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUSINESS 132-33 (1961), Although Professor Hamilton
was speaking of the corporation, his remarks apply to the State as well.
104. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
105. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
106. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (President cannot suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus).
107. 317 U.S. I (1942).
108. In Quirin, President Roosevelt convened a special tribunal of military officers to try Nazi
saboteurs even though the civil courts were operating and the United S tates itself was not a theater of
war, this action was upheld by the Supreme Court even though in Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall,) 2
(1866), the Court had invalidated the court martial of an alleged spy because the civilian courts were
open. For a recounting of the difficulties the Court and Attorney General Biddle had in finding a legal
basis for so trying the Germans, see F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY (1962); A. MASON, HARLAN
FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956).
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issue, they can merely ignore it-as President Eisenhower did after the
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.10 9
In Clark the Justice Department contended that the veto represented
"an infringement of the Constitution which it has an interest in protecting.
... , 1t0 The problem with this position is at least twofold. First, as Judge
Tamm said in his concurring opinion,
Not only does this argument assume a role for the Executive as "the protector
of the Constitution, but it also presupposes a decision on the merits of the
suit. Whether the statutory provisions the Government seeks to challenge do
or do not infringe on the constitutional powers of the President remains a
question for the courts to decide, not the Executive."'
In other words, Judge Tamm would not permit a bootstrap presentation.
It should be recalled that the Justice Department was granted only
permissive intervention in Clark, and not intervention of right. Arguments
against the constitutionality of the legislative veto were ably presented by
Mr. Clark's lawyers; there was no need for any executive intervention.1 2
Second, even taking theJustice Department's contention about protecting
the Constitution at face value, to attack the constitutionality of a validly
enacted law flies in the face of the President's constitutional duty to execute
the laws faithfully. The Department's response to this is that the
Constitution, as the fundamental law, must also be executed. Predicated
upon Supreme Court pronouncements begun in 1803 with Marbury v.
Madison"3 and culminating in 1974 with United States v. Nixon,
! !4
conventional wisdom acknowledges that the Supreme Court makes law
when interpreting the Constitution.1 5 That being so, the Executive has a
constitutional duty to execute the law as made by the Supreme Court, and
that law cannot be defied, as in Merryman, or ignored, as in Brown. We do
not maintain that this conclusion would be accepted by the Department of
Justice; but surely it is the logical extension of the Department's argument
that it has an interest in protecting the Constitution. Furthermore, the
Executive should not be allowed to pick and choose from among
constitutional provisions and judicial interpretations thereof: the article II
109. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
I10. Clarkv. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642,654 (D.C. Cir.),aff'dsubnon. Clarkv. Kimmitt,431 U.S.950
(1977).
111. Id. at 654 (Tamm, J., concurring).
112. Litigation, like politics, makes strange bedfellows. It is interesting to note that Clark's
counsel came from the organization of Ralph Nader, who has directed much of his reformist energy
against the Executive rather than Congress. See, e.g., Miller, Whistle Blowingandthe Law, in WIItsm"E
BLOWING 25 (R. Nader, P. Petkas & K. Blackwell eds. 1972). Mr. Nader opposes the congressional veto
because it offers an industry lobbyist a "third bite of the apple"; the first bite is taken while the bill is
pending, the second when the administrative regulations are proposed.
113. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
114. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
115. A candid acknowledgment of this lawmaking was expressed byiustice White, dissenting in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
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duty of faithful execution of the laws does not give the President any
discernible discretion.
It is evident from the foregoing that perceiving "the United States" as
a single entity makes the propriety of the Justice Department judicially
challenging an act of Congress dubious at best. Additional reasons support
this conclusion. First, on technical but sound historical grounds, no one is
permitted to sue himself. This is true not only for natural persons but also
for artificial persons, such as corporations. A fortiori, the principle also
applies to the State-"the United States." This latter statement, however,
should be a two-way street, which would make Kennedy v. Sampson" 1
6
and Nader v. Bork'1 7 questionable. Congress should not be able to argue
that the Department of Justice cannot challenge statutes, while
simultaneously doing the same itself. Thus, the Kennedy and Nader cases
should have been styled Congress v. President.
Second, the Presidential obligation faithfully to execute the laws does
not give the Chief Executive a selective item veto over the laws he is to
execute. Execution means enforcement and defense; it emphatically does
not mean "killing" some laws the President does not like." This has been
conclusively shown by the many cases on impoundment of funds.' 19 Under
the express terms of the Constitution, the President can veto bills passed by
Congress, but he does not have an item veto-and that is precisely what he
is attempting to enforce in cases such as Clark and Atkins.
Third, the undefined term, "executive power," at the beginning of
article II provides no basis for an independent reading of the Constitution.
In this connection, the little-noted but important case of Staats v. Lynn1
20
becomes significant. Under the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974, the Comptroller General is authorized to challenge any refusal by the
Executive to spend appropriated funds because he considers the
appropriation to be invalid. 121 In 1976, funds for housing were withheld by
116. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See note 10 supra.
117. 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973) (members of Congress had standing to sue for declaration
of the illegality of discharging Watergate Special Prosecutor Cox by the acting Attorney General).
118. Cf. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) ("To contend that the
obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their
execution, is a novel construction of the Constitution, and entirely inadmissable.").
119. E.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 42-48 (1975) (rejecting the argument that
Congress intended to grant wide discretion to the Executive to control amounts spent under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972); Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973) (rejecting a claim of Presidential discretion under
the Constitution); State Highway Comm'n of Mo. v. Volpe, 347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aft'd,
479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that anti-inflationary goals expressed in other statutes cannot
justify executive defiance of specific spending legislation).
120. No. 75-0551 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 1975) (dismissed by stipulation).i
121. Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1407 (1976). See Van Alstyne, The
Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A
Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the "Sweeping Clause," 36 011o ST. L. J. 788 (1975), AsJustice
Jackson said in the Steel Seizure Case, "With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have
discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the
law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); Mr. Staats, the
Comptroller General, brought suit against the President, the Director of
OMB, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
After the President was dropped as a party, the name of the case was
changed from Staats v. Ford to Staats v. Lynn; Lynn was the Director of
OMB. The General Accounting Office (GAO) was confronted with the
defense that the executive function under the Constitution permitted only
the President, through the Department of Justice, to represent the
government in court.1 22 Therefore, the argument went, the GAO, a
"legislative" agency, was improperly exercising an executive function. The
case did not go to final decision because the funds were released and spent
by HUD.
Staats is significant because it brings to center stage the propriety of
one branch of the federal government suing another branch. Can the
provision in the Budget Act be constitutionally justified? Under the
analysis we have put forth, the answer is no; the case should have been
styled Congress v. President. There is, however, an even stronger
constitutional case to be made for Congress than for the President. Under
the Constitution Congress may make all laws "necessary and proper" to
carry out Congress' delegated powers and also those of any other
department of the entire government.123 Since the appropriations power is
expressly vested in Congress, can there be any doubt that laws considered
necessary should be valid, particularly under the expansive reading given
the first part of the clause in McCulloch v. Maryland?124 Otherwise, how is
Congress to ensure that its will is fulfilled? Must it wait for the fortuity of a
suit brought by some citizen? We suggest that, under the Constitution,
Congress is not constrained to wait. In sum, the GAO's authority to sue
under the Budget Act is valid.
We do not maintain that separation of power questions are mere
logical deductions from unclear constitutional terms. No doubt it is true
that most of these questions are settled through the political process, and
that the courts do not have and should not have a substantial role in
resolving these questions. Even so, when the text of the necessary and
proper clause is, as L'il Abner would say, "clear enough that any fool kin
plainly see," it is not a logical deduction from a nebulous term. It is an
On the technical question of sovereignty, it could be argued that since Congress, speaking
generally, must waive sovereign immunity for immunity to be operative, Congress is"sovereign" in the
national government. See, e.g., Driver v. Helms, 456 F. Supp. 496 (D.R.I. 1978).That type oftechnical
argument, however, would hardly be persuasive in the situation under discussion.
122. See Williamson, GAO Goes to Court: The inpoundment Case, A Review of Background
and Issues in the First Lawsuit Ever Initiated by the Comptroller General in His Own Right, [1977]
GAO REv. 55.
123. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Professor Van Alstyne has cogently shown that thelatter half
of the necessary and proper clause has a "horizontal" as well as a "vertical" effect. Van Alstyne supra
note 121.
124. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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application of the plain, the only meaning of that clause to say that
Congress does indeed have ultimate power in such circumstances. One
may not like that, and surely the Executive does not, but the words are
there-and can be read in only one way. Within the multi-headed State
that is "the United States," Congress is supreme-when it wishes, which by
any criterion is not very often.
One may feel compassion for Mr. Jagdish Rai Chadha, who quite
possibly was treated shabbily by Congress when it vetoed the recommen-
dation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service that he be granted a
permanent visa. 125 Chadha, however, is not analogous to Simkins, in
which the court merely had to take judicial notice of controlling precedent
to invalidate the 'separate but equal' provision of the Hill-Burton Act, 1
26
Should compassion for a litigant guide a court? Should important
constitutional theory turn on the status of an alien about to be deported? If
the answer to that is yes, then there has been a definite move toward the
creation of a truly independent Executive.
What policy considerations should judges employ in legislative veto
cases? One has been mentioned, but surely there is enough in Professor
Wechsler's fervent plea for neutral principles 127 to conclude that a lawsuit
that presents important constitutional issues should not be decided on the
fact that Congress acted shabbily. The problem is one of power, not of
wisdom. 128 As Justice Frankfurter said in Dennis v. United States, "Much
that should be rejected as illiberal, because repressive and envenoming,
may well not be unconstitutional."'' 29 Mr. Chadha is incidental to the case;
without him the judicial process could not have been triggered. The crucial
issue is not whether Chadha can be deported by "the United States"; of
course he can be deported. Rather, the issue reflects a tug of war between
the Executive and Congress to determine whether the means of his
deportation comports with the Constitution. Chadha is not arguing
deprivation of procedural due process; rather, he seeks to invalidate one of
the ways that Congress has invented to effect acountability of the public
administration.
A ruling on the merits will mean that public policy can be made by
parties who are in agreement on the basic issue being litigated. If
permitted, this signals a breakdown of the adversary system. No doubt the
system has faults, 30 but should they be dealt with in an ad hoc, helter
125. See Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., No. 77-1702 (9th Cir. appeal
docketed July 18, 1977), in which, as of this writing, the Attorney General is challenging the
constitutionality of§ 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503(1976),
pursuant to which the United States House of Representatives vetoed the decision of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service to suspend the deportation of the petitioner Jagdish Rai Chadha.
126. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
127. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Laiv, 73 HARV. L. Ruv, 1 (1959).
128. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
129. 341 U.S. 494, 556 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
130. See Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, The Adversary System, and the Flow of
Information to the Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975).
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skelter manner? The answer can only be negative. It is completely
mysterious why, under any of the accepted interpretations of the article III
case or controversy requirement, a federal court should entertain the suit.
One need only cite Muskrat v. United States131 as conclusive authority that
such a case should be dismissed.
Furthermore, Congress, which passed the statute being litigated, is
not a primary party in the lawsuit. Thus, Congress, which surely has as
much interest in the litigation as the Immigration and Naturalization
Service or the Executive, has no control over the conduct of the suit. It
appears as amicus only-hardly the posture any litigant would desire. So it
was in Atkins and will be in other congressional veto cases not filed
against Congress. Some means should be found to bring Congress directly
into such judicial proceedings-on a regular, continuing basis. The
State-"the United States"-may be a single entity, but it is hydra-headed,
each head being "equal in origin and equal in title."' 32 That equality fails
if Congress is relegated to the inferior position of amicus curiae.
Finally, the Department of Justice has at times lacked the decency
formally to notify Congress that it is attacking a statutory provision duly
signed into law by the President. Contrast the manner in which Attorney
General Francis Biddle proceeded in the Lovett case-notifying both
Houses of Congress that he would support Lovett-with the failure to
notify in Atkins. 33 It is bad enough for a statute to be challenged, but it is
even worse for such a challenge to be mounted by surprise and without any
attempt to inform Congress about the Department's actions. At the very
least, Congress is entitled to believe that, unless it is otherwise notified, its
statutes will be defended by the Department. Moreover, it is entitled to
believe that its statutes will be defended fully-not, as in Buckley v.
Valeo, 34 with a partial effort.
On the basis of policy considerations as well as constitutional theory,
Presidential attacks on the constitutionality of federal statutes founder.
Such attacks fall far short of the degree of cooperation between the
political branches which, as Woodrow Wilson noted, is the forgotten part
of separation of powers.'35 The two branches must, and in most respects
do, cooperate. When they differ, as in the legislative veto, the dispute
should not be resolved by a group of lawyer-judges. Let the politicians
resolve their separation of powers problems, as they can if they have the
will to do so.
131. 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (holding that it is beyond the power of Congress to require thejudicial
branch to render advisory opinions).
132. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 701 (1864) (per Taney, C.J.).
133. 89 CONG. REc. A5350-52 (1943) (letter of Francis Biddle). Cf. Atkins v. United States, 556
F.2d 1028, 1058 (Ct. CL 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978) ("At oral argument, the Department
of Justice conceded the unconstitutionality of section 359(1Xb).").
134. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
135- W. WILSON, supra note 75.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Warfare between the two political branches of the federal government
can be fatal to the constitutional order. Americans can no longer subscribe
to the half-truth that powers were separated to prevent despotism.
136
Cooperation is a necessity, as is accountability. The problem is to make
necessary exercises of power as tolerable and decent as possible. Despite
some extravagant statements to the contrary, Congress emphatically is not
in the driver's seat in government. We have witnessed "the rise of the
bureaucratic state. 137 The bureaucracy is indeed ascendant, and may be
out of control. Certainly it is not controllable by judicial review. As
Professor Neustadt has pointed out, many a President has learned that he
may be the Chief Executive, but he still has to negotiate with the fiefdoms
in the public administration.
1 38
That, however, is the larger problem. Our immediate interest lies in
the propensity of Presidents and their Attorneys General to attack
statutes. What, if anything, should be done about it? A major step for
reform in this area could be a measure passed in the waning days of the
95th Congress.
On October 14, 1978, the Department of Justice Appropriation
Authorization Act 139 received final congressional approval. Section 13 of
the Act is the result of an amendment introduced by Congressman Elliott
Levitas. Section 13 requires that the Department of Justice report to the
appropriate committees of Congress any time that the Department does
not defend a statute of the United States, but rather concedes that it is
unconstitutional or attacks the validity of the statute.140 The Department
of Justice must transmit this report within thirty days after the Attorney
General determines the position of the Department is that the provision in
question is not constitutional. 4' According to the Act, after making such a
report, the Justice Department is required to declare in court that the
Department is representing the position of the executive branch of
government and therefore, by inference, is not representing the position of
"the United States" on the constitutionality of the statute.
42
Congressman Levitas, in detailing the reasons for his amendments,
explained that
[i]n recent years the executive branch through the Justice Department has
more and more taken it upon itself to decide that a statute passed by the
136. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-46 (1965).
137. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 PUB. INTEREST 77 (1975). This, to be sure, is
not a novel insight of Professor Wilson. See, e.g., D. WALDO, Tile ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1948),
138. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1960).
139. Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub, L. No.
95-624, 92 Stat. 3459.
140. Id. § 13(a).
141. Id. § 13(b).
142. Id. § 13(c).
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Congress and signed by the President, or enacted over his veto, is
unconstitutional [; that] the Congress found out about this action in a
willynilly, informal fashion without any reporting, requires that this actionbe done. 143
Moreover, with regard to the Department of Justice representing the
interests of "the United States," Congressman Levitas said,
[M]y amendment is designed solely to do two things: first, notify the House
and the other body when they [Department of Justice] are going to blackjack
us. We are saying we want them to let us know about it when they are going to
sandbag us, and then at that point they cannot claim to represent the United
States anymore; they are only representing the executive branch of the
government and not the United States, because when an Act of Congress is
passed and signed into law, it is the law of the United States, and I do not want
the Justice Department to pretend to be defending the United States when it is
not.
4 4
Prior to the Levitas amendment, three other proposals for re-
form were addressed to this separation of powers problem. One proposal
was the Separation of Powers Defense Act 145 introduced in 1976 by
Senator James Abourezk. Briefly, the bill would: (1) require the Attorney
General to notify Congress of civil actions when the Department has
decided not to appeal a decision holding congressional acts unconstitu-
tional, thus enabling Congress to intervene and appeal the decision; (2)
amend the law providing district court jurisdiction for suits on behalf of
the United States, 146 so that jurisdiction would not exist in actions by
the United States alleging the unconstitutionality of an act of Con-
gress; (3) amend the law that authorizes intervention by the United
States to argue questions concerning the constitutionality of acts of
Congress, 147 so that the Justice Department could only argue in favor of
the constitutionality of an act; and (4) permit Congress to intervene of right
in suits in which the constitutionality of an act of Congress is not defended
by the Justice Department or in which the Attorney General has decided
not to appeal a decision holding an act unconstitutional. As Senator
Abourezk explained, the purpose of the bill "is not to prevent the executive
branch from bringing an action or intervening in actions which challenge
the constitutionality of acts of Congress, but rather to prevent the
143. 124 CONG. Rac. HI1, 120 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Levitas).
144. Id.
145. S. 3854, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. See 122 CONG. Rac. S17,076-84 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976).
Additionally, § 250(aX) of the proposed Watergate Reform Act, S. 495, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
would have authorized Congress to retain counsel who would be asked to intervene on behalf of
Congress when the Department of Justice refused to represent Congress. See 122 Co.G. Rae. S12,114
(daily ed. July 21, 1976). Senator Abourezk had earlier introduced the provision as separate legislation.
S. 2731, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 38056 (December 2, 1975). The pertinent features
of these bills have been introduced in the 95th Congress as part of S. 555, the Public Officiasintegrity
Act of 1977. See 122 CoNG. REc. S1902-31 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1977).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976).
147. Id. § 2403.
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executive branch from asserting that it represents the United States when it
does So. ' 148
In contrast, the plan of Congressman Frank Thompson presents a less
sweeping approach toward reform.149 Thompson's bill, similar in some
respects to the Levitas amendment, would require any federal agency,
including the Department of Justice, to notify Congress if the agency fails
to enforce or defend any law enacted by Congress because it feels that the
law is unconstitutional. Under the bill, situations such as Atkins would be
avoided.' 50 Under the Thompson bill, Congress would be notified of
challenges by the Department of Justice to the constitutionality of a statute
within thirty days after the Attorney General had made such a
determination.
The third proposal, also submitted by Congressman Levitas,"'5 urged
that: "None of the funds made available by the Title may be used by the
Department of Justice directly or indirectly to urge the unconstitutionality
of any statute of the United States unless such statute has previously been
held unconstitutional by decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States."'' 5 2 Under this Levitas approach, the opinion and litigation
responsibilities of the Attorney General would remain unaffected except in
those instances in which the Attorney General concludes that a statute is
unconstitutional. At that point, the Attorney General, although having
concluded that a federal statute was unconstitutional, could not "urge" its
unconstitutionality in an opinion or litigation.
These plans to prevent the Attorney General from attacking the
constitutionality of a federal statute raise a common question of
constitutionality: to what extent may Congress regulate the Department of
Justice?t5 3 Few outside the executive branch would disagree with the
analysis of former Senator Sam J. Ervin that "[a'll powers of the Attorney
General and the Department of Justice flow from Acts of Congress. There
can be little doubt-in fact, no doubt at all-that what Congress gives,
Congress can take away."1 54 McGrain v. Daugherty155 offers encourage-
148. 122 CONG. REC. S17,076 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Abourezk).
149. Copy of Thompson draft obtained from Congressman Levitas' office. The bill was not
introduced, for reasons unrelated to the reform discussed here.
150. See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
151. This amendment was apparently not introduced because a point of order raised by
Congressman Rousselot to the relevant appropriation was sustained. See 124 CoNO. REc. H5525-26
(daily ed. June 14, 1976).
152. Letter from Patricia Wald, assistant Attorney General, to Congressman Peter Rodino,
Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary (June 26, 1978) (copy on file at Ohio State University
Law Library).
153. Complete analysis of the question is beyond the scope of this article. For an exhaustive
discussion of the subject, see Note, Removing Politics From the Justice Department: Constitutional
Problems With Institutional Reform, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 366 (1975).
154. Removing Politics From the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S,2803 Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1974).
155. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
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ment for that position. In McGrain, the Supreme Court said that "the
function of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties of the
Attorney General and the duties of his assistants are all subject to
regulation by congressional legislation."' 56 The proposals listed above thus
appear to be a proper form of congressional "regulation."
The question really is not the constitutional validity of these
proposals, but whether they go far enough. We suggest that they do not.
Should each or even all be adopted, something further is required. Briefly,
that "something" is a permanent lawyer or legal staff for Congress, similar
to the Office of the Solicitor General. Manned by superior lawyers, such an
office could perform a number of continuing functions: (1) litigating
separation of powers problems; (2) providing legal advice to both Houses
of Congress and their committees; and (3) monitoring the scrutiny of
proposed administrative regulations under the many statutory provisions
for legislative veto. 157 In some respects, this last function would be the most
important.
On October 12, 1978, the Congress gave its final approval to the
Ethics in Government Act, 158 which could be an important first step
toward the establishment of an Office of Congressional Legal Counsel.
The Act requires detailed public financial disclosure by top federal officials
in all three branches of government. The Act also establishes restrictions
on postservice activities by officials and employees of the executive branch.
Additionally, the Act sets up a mechanism for the appointment of a
temporary special prosecutor in cases of criminal wrongdoing by top
executive branch officials. Finally, and most importantly to this article,
Title 7 of the Act establishes an Office of Senate Legal Counsel to represent
the interest of the Senate in court. Title 7 also confers jurisdiction on the
courts to enforce Senate subpoenas.
Ideally, there should be established a joint House-Senate Office of
Congressional Legal Counsel. Indeed, the original Senate bill provided for
an Office of Congressional Legal Counsel to represent both houses. The
House version, however, did not contain a comparable provision and the
conferees were not willing to accede to the Senate version since the
appropriate committees of the House had not considered the question. 59
It is understood, however, that the Senate Legal Counsel will consult with
the House on litigation matters of interest to both houses.
There can be no doubt that Congress has the power to establish such
an office despite the contrary arguments of the Executive in Staats.16°
156. Id. at 178.
157. For a compilation, see Norton, Congressional Review, Deferral and Disapproval of
Executive Actions: A Summary and Inventory of Statutory Authority (1976) (published by the Library
of Congress' Congressional Research Service).
158. Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
159. See CONRF. REP. No. 95-1756, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1978).
160. See text accompanying notes 120-22 supra.
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Surely the time has come for Congress to have its own lawyer, rather than
having counsel on an ad hoc basis. Creation of a fulltime congressional
legal counsel and the proposed legislation to control the Department of
Justice are reforms needed to blunt Presidential attacks on the
constitutionality of federal statutes.
